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IN the majority of states in which mutual savings banks conduct
their business, their purchases of corporate securities are restricted
to narrowly defined categories meeting rigid statutory standards
or tests. Securities meeting those tests comprise the so-called legal
lists of the various states. Like the ratings assigned by the in-
vestment agencies, the legal lists constitute an important means
of ranking corporate bonds in order of quality. The present chap-
ter discusses the legal lists of Maine, Massachusetts, and New
York—lists that were prototypes for those of other states.
Following the outline of the preceding chapter, the first sec-
tion treats of the general nature of the legal lists, the conventions
followed in determining legal eligibility for purposes of this in-
vestigation, and the specific tests employed in drawing up the
lists of Maine, Massachusetts, and New York. The second section
traces changes in the volume and in the statistical characteristics
of securities on the legal lists, and investigates their stability over
business cycles and longer periods. The third and final section of
the chapter examines the comparative experience of legal and
nonlegal obligations as measured by default incidence, default
losses, and the over-all returns obtained by investors holding cor-
porate bonds over different periods in the life span of the issue.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGs
Legal lists are designed to provide small institutional investors
with a group of individually "safe" securities. Issues on the legal
lists are selected on the basis of compliance with an elaborate set.
of legal tests pertaining to assets, earnings, dividends, prior default
record, etc. An immediate consequence of the complexity and
severity of the legal tests is that the lists are highly selective, judged
both by the total volume of corporate bonds included, and by the
volume rated high grade by the agencies. In most of the years stud-
ied, from one-quarter to one-third of the total volume of straight
corporate bond outstandings was included on the legal lists of
Massachusetts, Maine, or New York, as compared with about212 LEGAL LISTS
75 percent rated as high grade by the investment agencies. Despite
the over-all limitations on volume, however, the amounts of eligi-
ble bonds have, over the long pull, increased in rough proportion
to the funds of mutual savings banks available for the purchase
of these and other investments. This was notably true of the New
York list. lEn 1916, for example, the total deposits of mutual sav-
ings banks in the United States were $4.3 billion and in 1944 were
$13.4 billion, an increase of 211 percent. Over the same period,
the par-amount total of bonds on the legal list of New York in-
creased from $2.9 billion to $8.4 billion or by 194 percent. The
Massachusetts list was more restrictive than the New York list
and the Maine list more liberal. Massachusetts legals increased
from $3.4 billion to $5.9 billion between 1916 and 1944, or by 75
percent. Maine first published an official list in 1923, admitting a
larger volume than other states. The volume of Maine legals
stood at $5.8 billion at the beginning of 1924 an.d rose to $9.4
billion at the beginning of 1944, an increase of 61 percent.
The legal lists—or more specifically, the legal tests on which
they are based—have been criticized repeatedly as antiquated and
needlessly restrictive; but the securities meeting the legal tests in
the past do not appear to have been markedly out of line with
the consensus of investment opinion of the time. Most of the out-
standing bonds on the legal lists were rated in the first four grades
by the investment agencies. Most of them were large issues, backed
by the power and financial strength of larger than average cor-
porate obligors. In most cases they were also well secured as to
earnings and assets. The principal weakness of the legal lists is
that they included a disproportionately large volume of rail bonds
in the twenties and early thirties (e.g., through 1924 the rails com-
prised over 98 percent of the total par amount of bonds eligible
for savings bank investment in New York arid over 91 percent in
Massachusetts, as compared with less than 58 percent for all issues
outstanding). The investment agencies and the "market" (in so
far as can be determined from the prices and yields of outstand-
ing issues) also favored the rails during the same period. By favor-
ing the rails, conservative investment opinion in effect prevented
the purchase of issues that had a better record during the Great
Depression. Other weaknesses of the legal lists are that they were
quite restrictive, and were far from consistent with one another.
In 1936, for example, 18 percent of the par-amount total of
straight bond outstandings was eligible for savings bank invest-LEGAL LiSTS 213
ment in Maine, 26 percent in Massachusetts, and 33 percent in
New York; and only 12 percent was eligible in all three of those
states.
In most instances when securities are dropped from a legal list,
the banking authorities require that they be liquidated promptly.
The banks affected are therefore vitally concerned with the sta-
bility of the lists. The data indicate that the legal lists were wholly
inadequate in this respect during the Great Depression. Between
the beginning of 1928andthe beginning of 1936, issues dropped
from the legal list of Maine shrank the volume of eligible cor-
porate bond investment by 41 percent. Similarly, the volume of
New York legals shrank by 25 percent between 1932 and 1940,
despite the passage of special legislation easing the legal tests in
that state. Since the prices of medium- and low-grade bonds were
high in the twenties and low in the thirties, the net effect of these
changes was to encourage the banks to purchase bonds when prices
were high and to force liquidation when prices were low. Similar
fluctuations did not occur in Massachusetts, but only because the
list was so highly restrictive in the twenties and because of an
easement of the earnings test in the thirties.
Over the shorter ups and downs spanned by most business
cycles, however, the legal lists (except Maine's) appear to have
been more stable than a list selected on the basis of agency rating
(see the preceding chapter). The primary reason for the cyclical
stability of the legal lists was the rapidity with which steps were
taken to modify the legal tests in periods of stress. Such steps were
not taken in Maine during the period studied, and the volume
of previously ineligible bonds added to the list of that state ex-
panded and contracted in perfect conformity with business cycles.
It will be recalled that the rating agencies also usually upgraded
bonds in good times and downgraded them in bad. A detailed re-
view of the legislation in this field reveals the extreme difficulty
of enacting strict rules of investment safety that will include a
reasonably large volume of outstanding issues, and that will at
the same time withstand the stresses and strains of the business
cycle.
Since the legal lists were highly selective and restrictive as to
volume, the proportion of legal bonds going into default was
markedly below that of nonlegals. On the other hand, the very
selectivity of the legal lists implies that the funds of the mutual
savings banks were channeled into narrowly restricted classes of214 LEGAL LiSTS
investments. The restrictions on volume pushed up the prices of
legal bonds and pushed down their promised yields to such an
extent that legals systematically sold toyieldless than other bonds.
In consequence, the yields realized on legal bonds were below the
corresponding yields on nonlegals, despite the higher default rates
of the nonlegals. The conclusion is that legal bonds taken individ-
ually were safer than nonlegal bonds but that in the aggregate
the promised and realized returns on legals were markedly lower.
NATURE OF THE LEGAL LISTS
From the scattered and incomplete sources available to us it is
rather difficult to find a precise statement of the philosophy under-
lying state control of savings bank investments in the United
States. It is nevertheless generally agreed among authorities in
this field that the primary purpose of the original legislation was
to provide the small institutional investor, having little access to
financial information and limited knowledge of financial proc-
esses, with a list of very high-grade investments—a "foolproof"
list for which the risks of default and of heavy default losses might
be considered negligible. When first established in the early part of
the nineteenth century, mutual savings banks were conceived to be
benevolent associations designed as depositories for the savings of
the poorer classes. Because of the typically small size of the banks,
the special nature of their depositors, and the fact that some of
them were originally staffed by nonprofessional, nonsalaried per-
sonnel, the states came to look upon their funds as special trusts,
requiring protection and regulation over and above that afforded
trusts generally.
With the rapid growth in the size of savings banks in later
years, and the spread of financial information and knowledge,
much of this legislation has come to be criticized as outdated. In
addition, the growing volume of federal debt and of mortgage
loans insured or guaranteed by the federal government now pro-
vides ready outlets for funds seeking low-risk investment. Under
the circumstances, legal corporates have not been particularly at-
tractive to savings bankers in recent years, although interest is re-
newed whenever the spread between the yields of governments
and corporates widens, as it did in 1952 and 1954.
Despite recent liberalizations of the laws, detailed legal restric-
tions on corporate bond investments still remain on the books
of twelve of the seventeen states in which savings banks now op-NATURE OF LEGAL LiSTS 215
erate. These states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.1 Of the five
other states in which detailed statutory tests are not specified,
Vermont follows the Comptroller's Ruling (cf. Chapter 3) by per-
mitting the purchase of bonds rated in the first four grades by two
approved rating agencies, Indiana requires that they be rated in
the first three grades by one agency, and Ohio permits savings
banks to purchase any bond eligible for commercial banks in that
state. Delaware and Maryland substantially follow the so-called
Massachusetts "prudent man rule"; i.e. any kinds and classes of
securities may be purchased, provided they meet standards of
investment quality that would be acceptable to prudent men
seeking a reasonable income and the preservation of their capital.
In New York from 1902 to 1950 a fiduciary holding funds for
investment was restricted to securities eligible for savings bank
investment unless the donor or testator had specifically granted
greater freedom under the terms of the trust. In 1950 an amend-
ment to the Personal Property Law, based on recommendations
made by the Trust Investment Study Committee of the New York
State Bankers Association, authorized investment up to 35 per-
cent in issues other than specified tax-exempt bonds and cor-
porates on the legal list (common stock purchase is permitted
under the terms of the amendment). The remaining 65 percent,
however, must still be invested in eligible securities, and, to the
extent that it is invested in corporate bonds, in issues on the
New York legal list.2 The Trust Investment Study Committee es-
timated that about 20 percent of all trusts by volume are restricted
to legal investments; and a study in April 1948 gave an unofficial
total of $13.5 billion trust funds in the state.3 In many other states,
including some in which savings bank investments are closely
regulated (e.g. Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts), trustees
under a personal trust are given wide latitude under the Massa-
chusetts prudent man rule.
Although twelve states require that savings bank investments
1SeeTentative Draft Model State Banking Code (American Bankers Asso-
ciation, 1948), pp.156-58.
2BascomH. Torrance, "New Trust Investment Law," Trusts and Estates,
May 1950.
3Reportof the Trust investment Study Committee (New York State
Bankers Association, 1949), p. 21, and Gilbert Stephenson, "Trust Business in
the United States," Trust Bulletin, April 1948.216 LEGAL LISTS
meet specific statutory standards, only five—Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York—provide for the
publication of an official legal list. Since most of the state laws
are involved and difficult to interpret, we were practically re-
stricted, when collecting the data for this investigation, to an
analysis of the published legal lists. As a further economy meas-
ure, the investigation was limited to the lists of Maine, Massa-
chusetts, and New York. The New York and Massachusetts lists
were selected for special study because they were published quite
early (the Massachusetts list in 1908; the New York list in 1915)
and also because the laws of those states were generally considered
at one time to be the best of their type. The Massachusetts law
was also used as a model for an important revision of the Con-
necticut statute, so that over most of the period spanned by our
records it was fairly representative of the law in. both states. Dur-
ing most of the period studied, the Massachusetts and New York
lists were quite conservative in that they prohibited investment in
industrial bonds, and in most public utility debentures. The
Maine list, which was first published in 1923, was selected as rep-
resentative of a more liberal statute that permitted investment in
such securities as well as other types not eligible in New York
and Massachusetts.
For the present investigation, legal eligibility was necessarily
determined almost exclusively from the published legal lists.
In the strict legal sense, issues appearing on the published legal
lists may not be eligible for savings bank investment; for each
issue the burden of proof of legality rests with the trustees of the
banks. Moreover, issues meeting the statutory legal standards may
not appear on the lists unless they are of sufficient public interest
to come within the purview of the banking authorities. Never-
theless, the lists are carefully prepared by special sections in the
state banking departments that devote full time to such work.
For that reason, and also because of the pressure brought by banks
and business corporations to secure eligibility for issues in which
they are interested, the lists are believed to be fairly complete,
at least for the larger issues. The following statement, however,
made in 1940 by William R. White, then New York State Super-
intendent of Banking, is typical of the cautious opinion expressed
by the state authorities as to the official status of the published
lists: "It [the legal list] has been prepared after a thorough inves-
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therefore, to be substantially correct; but, notwithstanding the
care that has been exercised in its preparation it is not to be as-
sumed that the list is a complete and infallible guide."4
In Maine, publication of a list of eligible local utility and in-
dustrial issues is not required by law. For purposes of this inves-
tigation, a list of local utility issues was prepared from authoriza-
tions of bond offerings published in the annual reports of the
Maine Public Service Commission. Since no official record appears
to have been kept of local industrial issues in Maine, the cov-
erage of our data is not entirely complete for them.5
A code for legal status was assigned to each large straight cor-
porate bond issue in the railroad, public utility, and industrial
fields, and to each issue in the 10 percent sample of small issues.
In addition to such securities the laws of most states also permit
investment in issues of the federal government, the states and
minor civil divisions, and the Dominion of Canada; equipmen.t
obligations and other serial issues of railroad, utility, and indus-
trial corporations; and selected guaranteed real estate mortgage
bonds. For the straight issues studied, legal status was originally
recorded at offering, at final extinguishment (or January 1, 1944,
for issues outstanding at that time), and at the beginning of the
quadrennial years, 1900, 1904, etc. To permit analysis of the
cyclical stability of the legal lists, comparable to that given the
agency ratings in Chapter 3, legal status was later recorded an-
nually for all large issues and for the 10 percent sample of small
issues.
Legal status at offering was determined from official publica-
tions appearing in the year following offering, and legal status
at extinguishment from the lists of the preceding year. For the
quadrennial and annual data on outstandings, the legal status.
of an issue refers to its eligibility as determined from the legal lists
with official publication dates nearest to the first quarter of the
year indicated (except for the year of extinguishment, when, for
contractual extinguishments, legal status was determined from
lists of the preceding year). The quadrennial prices, yields, and
most other statistics used in this investigation are also based on
first quarter data, so that the observations are roughly corn-
4 From List of Securities Considered Legal Investments for Savings Banks,
July 1, 1940 (New York State Banking Department) quoted in Commercial
and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 151, p. 132.
5 The legality of large Maine industrial corporations was determined from
opinions given in Moody's and Poor's investment manuals.218 LEGAL LiSTS
parable as to timing. The official publication dates of the legal
lists for the three states investigated are as follows:









The various statutory tests have been criticized repeatedly as
unnecessarily rigid and restrictive, as inadequately reflecting eco-
nomic growth within and between industries, as not allowing for
compensating factors of strength for issues that fail to meet one
or more of the legal tests, and so In large measure such criti-
cisms appear to be well taken; but from the purely analytical
point of view, the very rigidity of the legal tests has certain ob-
vious advantages. Unlike the agency ratings, which are constructed
on the basis of confidential systems of variables and weights, and
which reflect nonstatistical as well as purely statistical factors,
the legal lists are based on definite, known specific tests embodied
in the laws of the several states. Since the published lists are care-
fully drawn, the recorded experience of legal bonds affords a
unique opportunity to check on the specific-formula approach to
investment safety. In order that the experience records of legal
6 The first official Maine list was published in November 1923, but was
disregarded in favor of a revised list dated May 1924.
7 The first official Massachusetts list was published late in 1908, but was dis-
regarded in favor of a revised list dated February 1909.
S A complete official legal list was not published in NewYorkbetween
January 1, 1918 and July 1919, but revisions, more or less complete, were pub-
lished in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. The official January 1,
1918 list was used to determine legal status in 1918, and was brought up to
date by means of Chronicle revisions for 1919. The July 1919 list was used to
determine legal status in 1920. For 1921-28, legal lists dated January were used.
9 December lists were used to determine legal status in the calendar year
following.NATURE OF LEGAL LiSTS 219
bonds may be interpreted against the background of the spe-
cific tests employed in each state, the laws are summarized briefly
in the following pages, starting with New York, the most impor-
tant state in terms of volume of funds seeking legal outlets, and
then proceeding to Massachusetts and Maine.
New York Statutory Tests
Corporate bonds first became legal investments for New• York
savings banks in 1898.10 The original law restricted investment
to first or refunding mortgage bonds of local railroads, provided
that the issuer had paid, in each of the five years preceding invest-
ment, all principal and interest on its mortgage debt and divi-
dends of 4 percent or more on its common stock, and that the
outstanding common stock equaled at least one-half of the total
mortgage debt. The law was revised in the following year to in-
clude first mortgage bonds of selected railroads of other states
under the same conditions." At the same time, the Attorney Gen-
eral ruled that the Manhattan Elevated Railway Co. was a "rail-
road" and not a "street railroad" within the meaning of the law.
With that modification, the New York list consisted entirely of
railroad issues until 1928, when a limited number of first mort-
gage public utility issues were added.12
In a further effort to broaden the law, the railroad section was
codified and liberalized in Industrial issues generally and
public utility debentures (including those of the Bell System)
were ineligible until 1938, when the New York Banking Board
was given discretionary powers to add these and other securities
to the list.14 In 1949, the individual savings banks themselves were
granted limited discretionary powers to purchase securities not on
the legal list,15 and in 1950 public utility debentures, which had
previously been authorized by the Banking Board, were made stat-
utory legals by amendment of the law.16 The latter two develop-
ments, however, occurred after the terminal date of our records.
Since we are particularly interested in the default and loss experi-
ence of legal bonds during the Great Depression, the public util-
10 New York Laws 1898, c. 236.
11 New York Laws 1899, c. 386.
12 New York Laws 1928, c. 448.
15New York Laws 1929, c. 322.
'4 New York Laws 1938, c. 352, § 1.
New York Laws 1949, C. 522.
16 New York Laws 1950, C. 645.220 LEGAL LISTS
ity law of 1928 and the railroad law of 1929 are appropriate points
of departure and will be described below. During the thirties,
when most railroads did,not meet the earnings test, bonds of
nondefaulting railroads were kept on the list under Subdivision
7-a, which excluded the years 1931—36 from the computations.'7
Finally in 1938 a new Subdivision 7-a reduced the coverage re-
quired on rail bonds for the years 193 l_39.18
The principal types of tests employed in New York and else-
where concern the following: size, earnings, dividends, default,
and capital structure. The tests employed in New York for the
various industries in which investments are permitted are given
below along with the original dates of enactment.
SIZE TESTS
Railroads (1929):
Obligor must own and operate 500 miles of standard-gauge line exclu-
sive of sidings or have total operating revenues of $10 million in five
out of the six years preceding investment. An earlier (1914) law applied
such requirements only to railroads not incorporated in New York.
Gas and electric companies (1928):
Obligor must have average annual gross operating revenues of $1 mil-
lion over the five years preceding investment, and the par amount of
the issue must be $1 million or more.
Telephone companies (1928):
Obligor must have average annual gross operating revenues of $5 mil-
lion over the five years preceding investment, and the par amount of
the issue must be $5 million or more.
EARNINGS TESTS
Railroads (1929):
For first mortgage bonds, obligor must have earned charges one and
one-half times in each of five of the six years preceding investment and
in the last year.
17NewYork Laws 1932, c. 5, amended by L. 1933, c. 329; L. 1934, c. 149;
L. 1935, c. 563; L. 1936, c. 212; L. 1937, c. 145.
18NewYork Laws 1938, c. 352, amended by L. 1939, c.153, and L. 1940,
c. 420. The new Subdivision 7-a, as amended, provided that obligations of rail-
road corporations that failed to meet the more stringent provisions of Section
7 in. any or all of the fiscal years 1931—39 were to remain on the legal list pro-
vided earnings were sufficient to cover fixed charges at least once in each year
for at least five of the six years and in the year next preceding the time of
investment.
The 1938 law also included Subdivision 7-b which stated that a railroad
obligation purchased before April 1, 1938 might be held even though it later
failed to meet the requirements of Subdivisions 7 and 7-a.NATURE OF LEGAL LISTS 221
Forincome mortgage bonds, junior mortgage bonds, collateral trust
bonds, and debentures, obligor must have earned charges (including
full interest on income bonds, if any) twice in five of the six years pre-
ceding investment and in the last year, and must have a net income
after such fixed charges of $10 million or more.
Subdivision 7-a, as amended in 1938, 1939, and 1940: railroads not
meeting the above requirements in any of the years 1931—39 inclusive
must have earned charges at least once in five Out of the six years pre-
ceding investment and in the year next preceding investment.
Public utilities (1928):
Obligor must have earned charges twice on the average over the five
years preceding investment and twice in the last year.
DIVIDEND TESTS
Railroads (1929)
Obligor must have paid as cash dividends an amount equal to one-
quarter of its fixed charges in each of five of the six years preceding
investment or, if not paid, must have earned charges one and one-half
times in each of nine of the ten years preceding investment and in the
last year. An earlier (1914) law had required that dividends of 4 per-
cent be paid for five to ten years preceding investment (the length of
time depending upon the class of road) on book value of capital stock
outstanding in an amount equal to not less than one-third of the funded
debt.
Gas and electric companies (1928):
Obligor must have earned or paid at least 4 percent on a sum equal
to at least two-thirds of the funded debt in each of the five years preced-
ing investment.
Telephone companies (1928):
Obligor must have earned or paid 4 percent on all outstanding capital
stock in each of the five years preceding investment.
DEFAULT TESTS
Railroads (1929):
No default or delay in the payment of principal or interest must have
occurred for at least six years preceding the date of investment. An
earlier (1914) law specified no default for five years.
Public utilities (1928):
No default or delay in the payment of principal or interest for eight.
years prior to the date of investment.222 LEGALLISTS
OTHER PUBLIC UTILITY TESTS
Gas and electric franchise test (1928):
Obligor must have franchises needed to operate in the territory in which
75 percent of its gross revenue is earned, such franchises either to be
indeterminate or to extend five years beyond the maturity of the issue.
Equity-debt ratio test (1928):
The parvalueof the capital stock (or book value, if no-par stock) must
equal at least two-thirds the total mortgage debt.
Assets security test (1928):
Mortgage bonds outstanding must not exceed 60 percent of the value
of the property mortgaged. In the case of telephone companies, not
more than one-third of the property securing the issue may Consist of
stock or unsecured obligations of other telephone companies.
It is worth noting again that industrial issues generally, and
public utility debentures, were not legal investments in New
York State until 1938, when the Banking Board was given dis-
cretionary power to add such securities. It is indicative of the
difficulty of applying the specific-formula approach to the heter-
ogeneous industrial field that specific tests for such securities have
never been enacted in New York. The New York dividend and
earnings tests have had a checkered history in the railroad field.
They were applied between 1914 and 1917, set aside by moratoria
from 1918 through 1924 (the period of federal operation and four
years after), applied from 1925 to 1930, set aside by moratoria
from 1931 through 1939, and have been applied from 1940 to date.
Massachusetts Statutory Tests
In Massachusetts, savings banks were first permitted to invest in
corporate bonds in 1863. The authorized corporates were first-
mortgage bonds of Massachusetts railroads (excluding horse rail-
roads) that had earned and paid dividends for two years, and
debentures and notes of such roads if unencumbered by mort-
gage.1° First mortgage bonds of New England railroads became
eligible in 1881,20 and in 1899 the underlying bonds of certain
specifically designated large railroads incorporated in other
states.21 Under the act of 1899, it was required that the railroad
19MassachusettsActs of 1863, C. 175.
20MassachusettsActs of 1881, c. 214.
21MassachusettsActs of 1899, c. 269.NATURE OF LEGAL LISTS
have paid dividends on its capital stock of at least 4 percent
'in each of the preceding ten years and that the capital stock be
equal in amount to one-third the par value of the outstanding
bonds.
Local street railway bonds were admitted in 1902,22 and a
general railroad law, applicable to all roads in the United States,
was enacted in 1908.23 The latter act also provided for the pur-
chase of first mortgage or collateral trust bonds of telephone com-
panies the majority of whose directors were residents of Massachu-
setts and whose gross earnings for each of the five years preceding
investment had been at least $10 million per annum. (Only the
collateral trust bonds of American Telephone and Telegraph
Company qualified under the statute.) In 1919 bonds of local gas,
electric, and water companies were admitted to the list,24 and
bonds of out-of-state gas and electric companies became eligible
under a broad statute of 1926.25 This was two years before any
utility bonds appeared on the New York legal list.
Receiving powers analogous to those granted the New York
Banking Board in 1938, the directors of the Massachusetts Mutual
Savings Central Fund were authorized in 1945 to admit otherwise
ineligible issues provided they had the approval of the Banking
Commissioner.26 In both New York and Massachusetts, industrials
generally, and public utility debentures, first became legal under
the discretionary provisions of such a law. The Massachusetts
act of 1945 also overhauled rather thoroughly the statutory tests
applied to underlying utility bonds, but these various liberaliza-
tions came too late to be reflected in our records. The basic legis-
lation for our purposes is the act of 1908 covering out-of-state rail-
roads and the act of 1926 covering out-of-state utilities. The essen-




Obligor must either own in fee 500 miles of standard-gauge line exclusive
of sidings or have had gross earnings of $15 million in each of the ten
22 Massachusetts Acts of 1902,c.483.
23 Massachusetts Acts of 1908, C. 590, § 68, amended by Acts of 1991, c. 346,
Acts of 1941, c. 413, and Acts of 1943, c. 215.
24 Massachusetts General Acts 1919, C. 104.
25MassachusettsActs of 1926, c. 351, amended by Acts of 1931, c. 345, and
Acts of 1937, c. 96.
26 Massachusetts Acts of 1945, C. 377.224 LEGALLISTS
years preceding investment (reduced to five years under a 1931 amend-
ment). (New England railroads are not bound by this requirement.)
Obligation must be secured by a first or refunding mortgage on 75
percent of the line owned in fee, and by not less than 100 continuous
miles of standard-gauge line; or by a first or refunding mortgage on 10
percent of the line, and by not less than 500 continuous miles of stand-
ard-gauge line. (New England railroads are not bound by this require-
ment.)
Gas and electric companies (1926):
Obligor must have had gross operating revenue of at least $1 million
in the year immediately preceding investment, not less than 75 percent
of which was derived from the sale and distribution of electricity or
artificial gas (natural gas added in 1931), and not more than 20 percent
of which was derived from the operation of a transportation system.
Telephone companies (1908):
Obligor must have had gross income of at least $10 million in each of
the five years preceding investment.
Obligation must be secured by a first mortgage on at least 75 percent
of the property of the telephone company or by the deposit of stocks
and bonds of other telephone companies equal in value to at least one
and one-third the par amount of the secured obligation.
EARNINGS TESTS
Railroads (1908):
Gross earnings must have been at least five times total fixed charges in
each of the ten years preceding investment (reduced to five years in
1931); bonds already purchased are not rendered ineligible by reason of
the failure of the obligor to meet this test for two years, but no further
investment may be made unless the obligor complies in the following
year. (Does not apply to New England corporations.)
An additional requirement was added in 1941, when the dividend test
was dropped (see below) and replaced by the requirement that, for
certain types of obligations, the railroad shall have earned fixed charges
one and one-half times in five out of the six years immediately preceding
investment and in the last year (in 1943 changed to six out of seven
years).
In 1943 issues of railroads reorganized under Section 77 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act were also made eligible for investment provided that
in the year preceding investment, and on the average over the ten years
preceding investment, the net railway operating income was twice fixed
charges, and that it exceeded fixed charges by at least 8 percent of gross.NATURE OF LEGAL LISTS 225
Gas and electric companies (1926):
Earnings available for fixed charges must have been at least twice fixed
charges on total funded debt in each of the five years immediately
preceding investment. In 1945 the earnings requirement was reduced,
for corporations obtaining at least 60 percent of their gross business
solely from the sale and distribution of electricity, to an average of one
and three-quarters times fixed charges over the five years immediately
preceding investment and in the last year.
DIVIDEND TESTS
Railroads (1908):
Cash dividends equal to at least 4 percent on all outstanding capital
stock must have been paid in each of the five years preceding invest-
ment by New England railroads, and in each of ten years by other
railroads. The period of compliance for other than New England rail-
roads was reduced to five years in 1931 and was replaced by an earnings
test in 1941 (see above).
Street railways (1908):
Cash dividends of 5 percent on all outstanding capital stock must have
been paid in each of the five years preceding investment. (Local street
railways are the only ones whose obligations are eligible for investment
in Massachusetts.)
Telephone companies (1908):
Cash dividends of not less than 6 percent on all outstanding capital
stock must have been paid in each of the five years preceding invest-




Obligor must have paid matured principal and interest on all of its
mortgage indebtedness for ten years (the requirement was changed to
five years in 1931); in 1943 a provision was added for corporations
reorganized under Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act that no
defaults on any fixed charges shall have occurred after the date of re-
organization.
Telephone companies (1908):
Obligor must have paid the matured principal and interest on all of
its obligations in each of the five years preceding investment. A similar
provision was added for gas and electric companies in 1945.226 LEGAL LISTS
CAPITAL STRUCTURE TESTS
Railroads (1908):
The outstanding funded debt shall not exceed three times the value
of the capital stock. (Does not apply to New England railroads.)
Gas and electric companies (1926):
The par value of the capital stock shall not be less than two-thirds of
total funded debt. For corporations with no-par stock, the book value
of the property shall be at least equal to two-thirds of total mortgage
debt.
In 1945 the capital structure requirement was changed to provide that
the book value of the capital stock and surplus shall not be less than 60
percent of total funded debt, and that the par value of total mortgage
debt shall not exceed 75 percent of the depreciated book value of the
property.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
In the case of railroad and gas and electric companies, less stringent pro-
visions than those set forth above are applied to New England corpora.
tions, while investment in street railway bonds is restricted solely to
Massachusetts corporations. Additional provisions of the laws generally
restrict investment to underlying issues or issues well secured as to lien
position. Under the Act of 1926 gas and electric bonds were eligible
only if they matured in not over 30 years, the requirement being liberal-
ized in 1937 to permit maturities up to 40 years. The Act of 1926 also
requires that franchises covering 75 percent or more of the gross busi-
ness of the utility must either be indeterminate or extend at least three
years beyond the maturity of otherwise eligible bonds.
As in New York, so also in Massachusetts, difficulties have been
encountered in applying rigid statutory standards to corporate
bonds, especially in the railroad and industrial fields. For rail-
roads, the 1908 law permitted noncompliance with the earnings
test in two successive years, and by Acts of 1919 and 1920 all tests
were set aside for the period of federal operation plus two years.27
Again, beginning in 1933, a series of moratoria omitted from the
tests fiscal years ending January 1, 1931 through April 1, 1939.28
Further evidence of the difficulty of applying rigid statutory stand-
2TMassachusettsActs of 1913, c. 291, General Acts of 1915, c. 273, General
Acts of 1919, c. 13, and Acts of 1920, c. 420.
28MassachusettsActs of 1933, c. 111, Acts of 1934, C.80,Acts of 1935, c. 73,
Acts of 1936, c. 84, and Acts of 1937, c. 56. The 1939 law, c. 87, omitted fiscal
years 1931 through 1940 and up to July 1, 1941 so long as net income as de-
fined by the Interstate Commerce Commission had been earned in three of
the five years immediately preceding investment.NATURE OF LEGAL LISTS 227
ards to corporate obligations is the fact that industrial bonds gen-
erally, and gas, electric, and telephone company debentures, are
not statutory legals in Massachusetts, although, as has been noted
above, such obligations may now be placed on the legal list by
special action of the Mutual Savings Central Fund. Underlying
public utility bonds were added to the Massachusetts list in 1926,
two years before similar action was taken in New York, but the
Massachusetts law was the more conservative of the two in the
late twenties and the thirties. In particular, the Massachusetts
legislature did not follow the action taken in New York State of
liberalizing the earnings test for railroads in 1929.
Maine Statutory Tests
Investments of savings bank funds were first regulated in Maine
in 1869 under a liberal statute that permitted the banks to make
any safe, nonfraudulent investment,20 but shortly thereafter the
pendulum swung towards greater restriction. In 1874 investments
were restricted to securities issued by natural persons or corpora-
tions in the New England states, by a few municipalities, and by
the United States government30; and in 1877 were still further re-
stricted to the first mortgage bonds of Maine railroads, and to the
bonds and stocks of Maine utility and industrial corporations
paying dividends of 6 percent or From that point on-
ward, however, the law was gradually relaxed, first to include
New England corporations, then corporations in certain desig-
nated states, and finally corporations in all other states provided
they met certain specific tests.
First mortgage bonds of completed railroads in specifically de-
signated states and of several transcontinental lines were admitted
in 1883,32 and bonds of railroads in other states were admitted in
In 1885 securities of local water companies other than first
29 Maine Public Laws 1869, c. 60 § 5.
80 Maine Public Laws 1874, c. 266.
81. Maine Public Laws 1877, C. 218. In 1883 the dividend test for local utility
and industrial corporations was reduced to 5 percent (Maine FL. 1883, c.
202 § 3), and in 1909 was changed to the requirement that earnings after fixed
charges and running expenses be at least 5 percent on an amount of capital
stock equal to one-half the entire funded debt (Maine P.L. 1909, c. 11).
32 Maine Public Laws 1883, C. 202 § 3.
83 Maine Public Laws 1917, c. 305 §1. For roads not in the specifically
designated states, it was required (1) that the issue be secured by a lien on at
least 100 miles of completed standard-gauge line exclusive of sidings, (2) that
gross operating revenues shall have been at least five times all fixed charges
for interest and rentals in each of the three years preceding investment, and228 LEGAL LiSTS
mortgage bonds were dropped from the list of eligible invest-
ments,34 but in, 1893 the first mortgage bonds of water companies
incorporated in New Hampshire were added,35 and in 1903 those
of similar companies incorporated in the other New England
states.36 Eligible local Street railway bonds were first defined ex-
plicitly in 1895 (the line must have been completed, or. equity
equal to at least one-third the mortgage debt must have been ex-
pended in its and completed street railways in
selected states were added in 1903.36
A major revision, codification, and liberalization of the statute
occurred in 1923 under legislation that provided for publication
of the first official list; changed the earnings test for railroads; per-
mitted investment in, and established general standards for, out-
of-state utilities (gas, electric, street railway, water, and telephone
companies); and revised the earnings requirement for bonds and
stocks of Maine industrial corporations.38 Important revisions
since then include the addition of out-of-state industrial issues in
a reduction of the earnings test for water companies in
and the dropping of street railways and liberalization of
the railroad law in The provisions of the 1923 law pertain-
ing to other than local obligors, and important amendments




Obligor must own in fee 500 miles of standard-gauge railroad exclusive
of sidings, or must own 100 miles of standard-gauge railroad exclusive
of sidings and have received gross operating income of not less than
$10 million in each of the five years immediately preceding investment.
Gas, electric, street railway, and water companies (1923):
Obligor must have had average gross earnings of at least $500 thousand
(3) that net earnings shall have equaled at least one and three-quarters fixed
charges in the three years preceding investment.
Maine Public Laws 1885, c. 277.
85 Maine Public Laws 1893, c. 195.
36 Maine Public Laws 1903, c. 190.
Maine Public Laws 1895, c. 161.
88 Maine Public Laws 1923, c. 144 § 27.
89 Maine Public Laws 1929, c.102.
4° Maine Public Laws 1935, c. 77 § 1-3.
Maine Public Laws 1937, c.104.NATURE OF LEGAL LISTS 229
in the three years immediately preceding investment. The requirement
was reduced to $250 thousand for water companies in 1935; street rail-
ways were dropped from the eligible list in 1937.
Telephone companies
Obligor must have had gross revenues of $5 million in each of the three
years immediately preceding investment (also see under Earnings Tests
below). The law was revised in 1931 to require a gross of $5 million for
five years.
Industrials (1929):
Obligor must have had $10 million net income available for fixed
charges, or in special cases, $2 million, for each of the five years preced-
ing investment (see under Earnings Tests below).
EARNINGS TESTS
Railroads (1923):
Obligor must have earned charges on eligible first mortgage and re-
funding obligations (those secured by at least 75 percent of the line)
and on all prior liens one and one-half times for five consecutive years
preceding investment, and also for twelve consecutive months in, the
fifteen months preceding investment. Before 1937, earnings of the obligor
were determined after deducting "all operating expenses, maintenance
charges, depreciation, rentals, taxes, and guaranteed interest and divi-
dends paid by or due from it." In 1937 the period of compliance was
reduced to three years and earnings were redefined to conform with
the Interstate Commerce Commission's concept of "income available
for fixed charges."
Gas, electric, street railway, and water companies (1923):
Obligor must have had for the three years preceding investment an
average net income of twice charges on eligible obligations (plus prior
liens), and must have earned fixed charges one and one-half times for
twelve consecutive months within the fifteen months immediately pre-
ceding investment. The requirements for water companies were reduced
in 1935 to one and one-half and one and one-quarter times charges,
respectively.
Eligible obligations are: first and refunding mortgage bonds secured by a
lien on at least 75 percent of the property and by a franchise extending
at least three years beyond the maturity of the issue. Net income avail-
able for fixed charges is defined as for railroads in the 1923 law (see
above).
Telephone companies (1923):
Obligor must have earned charges twice on eligible first mortgage and
refunding obligations (plus all prior liens) in each of the three years230 LEGAL LISTS
preceding investment (extended to five years in 1931). Net income avail-
able for fixed charges is defined as for railroads in the 1923 law (see
above).
Until 1937, when debentures of the Bell System became eligible, invest-
merits in telephone company bonds were restricted to first and refund-
ing mortgage obligations secured by at least 75 percent of the property,
and to collateral trust bonds of "telephone companies" (American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company) having a gross of more than $75 million
and earning charges three times in each of the three years preceding
investment.
Industrials (1929):
Bonds or notes (including debentures) of any corporation that in each
of the five years immediately preceding investment had a net income
of not less than $10 million and at least twice the interest on the entire
funded debt, or not less than $2 million and at least four times the in-
terest on the entire funded debt.
DEFAULT TESTS
Gas, electric, street railway, and water companies (1923):
Obligor must not have defaulted on any of its obligations for a period
of fifteen months preceding the date of investment.
Telephone companies (1923):
Obligor must not have defaulted on any of its obligations for a period
of three years preceding the date of investment (extended to five years
in 1931).
CAPITAL STRUCTURE TESTS
Gas, electric, railroad, street railway, and water companies (1923):
The total of eligible issues outstanding plus all prior liens shall not ex-
ceed three times the outstanding capital stock on the date of invest-
ment. In 1937, the law was amended to provide that total funded in-
debtedness shall not exceed three times the outstanding capital stock.
Comparison of the provisions of the Maine statutes with those of
Massachusetts and New York indicates that Maine has on the
whole been the most liberal of the three states. A general public
utility law was first enacted in Maine in 1923, three years before
the passage of similar legislation in Massachusetts, and five years
before such action was taken in New York. The Maine law also
permitted investment in industrial issues and in telephone deben-
tures, securities not statutory legals in the other two states, but
now eligible under the discretionary powers granted official bodies.VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 231
The Maine Act of 1937 applied to railroad obligations a some-
what more liberal set of statutory tests than the other two states',
and also provided for investment in otherwise ineligible first
mortgage bonds of steam railroads, upon the written application
of a special committee of the Savings Banks Association of Maine.
On the other hand, the tests have been applied more consistently
in Maine than elsewhere. As in other states, the earnings test for
railroads was forgiven during the period of federal operation and
two years thereafter, but was applied relentlessly from that time
forward. Despite the greater liberality of the Maine statutes, or
rather because of that and the consistency of application, the
shrinkage of the legal list during the Great Depression was greater
there than in the other states.
VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL BONDS
Changes in the state laws regulating savings bank investment and
in the ability of corporate obligors to meet the statutory tests have
produced important changes in both the volume and the compo-
sition of securities on the legal lists. Significant developments in
these respects are described in the present section. Like our other
materials on the volume and characteristics of bond offerings and
outstandings, the basic data are universe estimates, obtained by
combining information on all large straight issues with that for
the 10 percent sample of small issues, after adjustment of the
latter for sample size.
Outstandings
Series on the number and par amount of outstanding issues eli-
gible for savings bank investment in Maine, Massachusetts, and
New York are presented in Chart 11, running in each case from
the beginning of the quadrennial year next following the first
official publication date of the list to 1944 (when our records termi-
nate). Analysis of the chart in the light of the legal history pre-
sented earlier provides ample evidence of the difficulties of es-
tablishing generally sound and acceptable standards of invest-
ment safety by legislative fiat.
The number of issues on the New York legal list remained vir-
tually unchanged between 1916 and 1924, and the total par
amount increased only gradually from $2.9 billion to $3.7 billion.
Except for a few elevated railway issues eligible under an earlier
special ruling of the Attorney General, the list throughout that232 LEGAL LISTS
CHART 11—Number and Par Amount of Outstandings Legal in














Universe estimates for straight bonds, January figures, from "Stafistical Measures,"
Tables 7 and 8.
periodconsisted entirely of railroad bonds. Public utilities were
added sufficiently early in 1928 to be placed on the official list for
that year (but several years after similar legislation had been en-
acted in Maine and Massachusetts). As a result of the New York
legislation, the legal list expanded by $2.8 billion between 1924
and 1928, of which the new utility bonds accounted for $2.0 bil-
lion and rails for $0.8 billion.
Despite the severe business contraction of the early thirties, an
almost equally large expansion of the New York list occurred be-
tween 1928 and 1932 from the addition of $2.2 billion rail bonds
and $0.5 billion utilities. The expansion of the rail list was caused
by the liberalization of the rail law in 1929, and by emergency
legislation early in 1932 that excluded 1931 earnings from the
test. With the advantage of hindsight, the liberalization of 1929
0
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appears unfortunate. Although perhaps difficult to foresee at the
time, it would have been far wiser to permit greater diversifica-
tion by broadening the utility and industrial sections of the list.
The emergency legislation of 1932 is more difficult to appraise.
The act provided that any railroad security on the legal list as of
January 1, 1931 should remain on the list unless a default oc-
curred. This in effect meant that the banks could continue to pur-
chase various low-grade rail issues (the Subdivision 7-a legals) but
were required to dispose of their holdings promptly if they went
into default. The legislation resulted in the retention on the New
York legal list of $5.0 billion of low-grade rail bonds in 1932, an
amount equal to three-quarters of the entire rail list at that time.
The subsequent record shows that about 17 percent of this amount
went into default by 1940. As the analysis of Chapter 2 has in-
dicated, sale at default in the 1930's resulted in huge and largely
avoidable losses. Yet forced sale of the entire group of Subdivision
7-a legals in 1932 would doubtless have resulted in even greater
losses. As it was, the average price of these issues was under 75
at that time. The data of Chapter 2 show that retention in a pe-
riod of stress is usually good policy; on the other hand, the per-
mission given the savings banks to expand their low-grade rail
holdings in 1932 was probably unwise, since many of these issues
later went into default.
A shrinkage of $0.4 billion in the total of bonds on the New
York list between 1932 and 1936 resulted from a decrease of $0.5
billion in the volume of eligible rail bonds partially offset by an
increase of $0.1 billion in the volume of eligible public utilities.
The railroad shrinkage was caused mainly by the dropping of de-
faulted bonds from the legal list. By 1940 the list had shrunk by
an additional $1.9 billion, as the result of a further decline in rail
earnings and of various changes in the law. A substantial amount
of telephone debentures was placed on the legal list by special
action of the Banking Board and a smaller amount of industrials,
but these additions were more than offset by deletions of $2.8
billion from the rail list. As has been indicated, emergency legis-
lation of 1938, 1939, and 1940 provided that during the period
1931—39 previously eligible rail issues were to remain on the legal
list and were to be eligible for new investment if interest charges
were earned at least once in each of five of the six years preceding
investment, and also in the year immediately preceding invest-
ment. Many of the railroads, however, were unable to meet even234 LEGAL LISTS
this minimum standard, and $2.5 billion par amount of their
issues were dropped from the list. In addition, $0.3 billion of rail
bonds were dropped as they went into default. Although banks
and trustees were not permitted to purchase rail issues that failed
to meet the reduced test, the emergency legislation of the late
thirties provided that they could continue to hold them if pur-
chased earlier even though they might subsequently go into de-
fault. Capital losses would have been reduced considerably if such
legislation had been enacted earlier in New York and in the other
states.
The general expansion of corporate profits in the early war
years and the discretionary powers granted the Banking Board
resulted in an over-all expansion of the New York legal list of
$1.5 billion between 1940 and 1944. Ironically enough, in view of
the preceding depression experience, most of the additions were
rail bonds ($0.9 billion), and over three-quarters of these were low-
grade Subdivision 7-a legals. Over the same period the public
utility list expanded by only $0.5 billion and the industrial list by
as little as $0.1 billion.
It will be observed by those familiar with the history of security
values that the broad trends in the volume of securities eligible
for savings bank investment in New York were roughly similar
to those of the prices of medium- and low-grade bonds, rising dur-
ing the twenties, falling during most of the thirties, and rising
again from the beginning of World War II to the close of the
period studied. To an appreciable extent, the fluctuations in the
volume o.f eligible bonds were caused by the various statutory tests
and amendments. It would thus appear that the net effect of
much of this legislation was to encourage the banks to purchase
bonds when prices were rising or high, and to force them to sell
at a loss after the bonds had dropped from the legal list.
The movements in the volume of securities eligible for savings
bank investment in Maine are illustrative of what can happen
when a basically more liberal set of statutory tests is applied re-
lentlessly throughout a boom and a great depression. Over $5.8
billion of corporate bonds were eligible in Maine at the beginning
of 1924, 58 percent more than in New York and 67 percent more
than in Massachusetts. Between then and 1928, $2.2 billion par
amount were added ($0.8 billion of rail bonds and $1.4 billion of
utilities). Since the Maine statutory tests were unchanged during
this period, these increases were due solely to growth in the vol-FOLUME AND CHARACTERISTiCS 235
ume of corporate outstandings, and in the proportion that met
the legal tests. Over the next four years, 1928—31, though the legal
lists of Massachusetts and New York both expanded, the list of
Maine contracted by $1.1 billion ($2.1 billion rail bonds, partially
offset by additions of $0.8 billion utilities and $0.2 billion in-
dustrials). Again, no legal changes occurred during the period,
other than the addition of a small amount of industrials in 1929;
moreover, a moratorium on the earnings test for railroads, similar
to those of Massachusetts and New York, was not enacted in
Maine. The decline in the volume of eligible bonds thus reflects
almost entirely the changing ability of obligors in the different in-
dustry groups to meet the legal tests. Between 1932 and 1936, the
Maine list contracted even more severely than in 1928—31 (an
over-all decline of $2.2 billion par amount, of which $1.4 billion
of the issues dropped were rails, $0.7 billion utilities, and $0.1
billion industrials). The contraction of the utility list occurred
despite a liberalization of the law covering water companies in
]935.
From 1936 through the first quarter of 1944 the Maine legal
list almost doubled in volume, although the total of corporate
outstandings was contracting at the time. The addition of $4.6
billion legal bonds in the period—comprised of $2.4 billion rails,
$1.9 billion utilities, and $0.3 billion industrials—largely reflected
the wartime expansion of corporate earnings. The rail law was
also liberalized in this period, and the Bell System debentures
were added.
Because of the rigid application of the statutory tests in Maine,
the upper and lower turning points in the volume of eligible se-
curities, in so far as they can be determined from the quadrennial
data, led those of New York, and the amplitude of variation was
somewhat greater. In effect, Maine savings banks were required to
dispose of a larger proportion of their corporate holdings than in
New York, and to sell them somewhat earlier, but were also per-
mitted to re-enter the market earlier. The economic consequences
of these developments will be examined in a later section on bond
experience.
During most of the years covered by our records the Massachu-
setts list was more conservative than those of Maine and New
York; and on the whole, it was the most stable of the three. From
1912 to 1924 the par amount of outstanding issues eligible for
savings bank investment in Massachusetts ranged between $2.0236 LEGAL LISTS
billion and $3.7 billion. The Massachusetts list, like that of New
York, was then almost entirely a rail list. The first important li-
beralization occurred in 1926 with the passage of the act covering
out-of-state utilities. As a result the volume of eligible securities
increased from $3.5 billion in 1924 to $4.8 billion in 1928, all
except $0.1 billion of the increase occurring in the public utility
field. Unlike the Maine list, the Massachusetts list did not con-
tract over the next four-year period (1928—31) but the expansion
($0.9 billion) was less than one-third that of New York, since few
rails were added.
The Massachusetts legal list was atypical between 1932 and
1936, an increase of $1.2 billion occurring while there were large
shrinkages in both Maine and New York. For one thing, the
Massachusetts railroad law of 1932 was more conservative than
New York's and Maine's, so that less attrition occurred later
because of defaults. Then, in 1933 the Massachusetts legislature
followed New York by omitting the years 193 1—39 from the rail
earnings test. An early provision of the Massachusetts law is inter-
esting in this connection, since it gave the banks somewhat more
room to maneuver jn this difficult period. As in other states,
Massachusetts banks are required to sell most bonds promptly at
default, but already-purchased issues of railroads incorporated
outside New England are not rendered ineligible by failure of
the obligor to meet the earnings test for two years, provided they
are not in default. Under this provision, savings banks. in Massa-
chusetts are permitted a more orderly liquidation of securities ap-
proaching ineligible status. The law was passed in 1908. Similar
but broader legislation was not enacted in New York until 1938.
Between 1936 and 1940 the Massachusetts utility list expanded
by $0.5 billion, primarily because of improved earnings and the
passage of a more liberal statute that permitted investment in
maturities up to forty years (formerly limited to thirty years).
Over the same period, however, the rail list contracted by $0.7 bil-
lion, so that the total list declined by $0.2 billion. Similarly, the
Massachusetts list contracted during the next four years by a net
amount of $0.8 billion, the result of an elimination of $1.5 billion
rail bonds, and an addition of $0.7 billion utilities. The rail bonds
were dropped when the moratorium on the earnings test was ter-
minated on July 1, 1941.VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 237
CHART 12—Distributionof Outstandings by Major Industry
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Universe estimates for straight bonds in par amount, January figures, from "Sta-
tistical Measures," Table 7.
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Characteristics of Legal Bonds
Analysis of percentage distributions of the par-amount totals of
legal bonds by various characteristics permits us to trace the effects
of the statutory tests upon the composition of the legal lists. Dis-
tributions by major industry groups are presented in Chart 12,
and similar breakdowns covering other significant characteristics
are given in Table 41.
The chart shows that the legal lists were comprised largely of
rail bonds until after the Great Depression. Over 98 percent of•
the total par amount of straight corporate bonds eligible for sav-
ings banks investment in New York State, and over 91 percent of
the amount eligible in Massachusetts, were rail bonds through the
first quarter of 1924, as compared with from 46 to 58 percent of
the total of all issues outstanding over the same period. With the
legalization of public utilities in Maine in 1923, in Massachusetts
in 1926, and in New York in 1928, the relative importance of the
rails declined; but even so, approximately two-thirds of the lists,
by volume, were rails as late as 1928. Because of the various mora-
toria on the rail earnings tests the rails continued to dominate
the legal list of Massachusetts through 1940 and of New York
throughout the period studied. Since a moratorium did not occur
in Maine, the public utilities dominated the legal list of that state
from 1932 onward.
In view of the depression experience, it is curious that as late
as the first quarter of 1944 two of the state lists still contained a
larger proportion of rail issues than did total outstandings in the
market: 43 percent for Maine and 51 percent for New York,
against 42 percent for the market as a whole. Massachusetts was
the only exception, the end of the moratorium in 1941 having
brought the rail proportion down to 38 percent.
Compared with the proportions of public utilities in total out-
standings, the legal lists neglected the utilities as a class through-
out the early period. Utilities have, however, been favored in
Maine since 1932, and been given increased representation in
Massachusetts and New York since 1940. In all states the indus-
trials were neglected during the entire period studied, perhaps
partly because of the difficulty of adapting the legal machinery to
changing economic conditions, but primarily because of the prob-
lem of formulating sound and sufficiently inclusive tests for the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that industrial bonds were still under-represented in New York in
1944, even though discretionary power to add such securities had
been granted as early as 1938. A similar law was passed in Massa-
chusetts in 1945, but it is not reflected in our statistics.
The materials of Table 41 highlight other important charac-
teristics of the legal lists. As compared with all issues outstanding
in the market on the indicated observation dates, relatively large
proportions of the par-amount totals of legal issues were rated in
the first four grades by the investment agencies, were large issues
of large obligors, were listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
and had exceptionally long terms to maturity. In addition, rela-
tively large proportions were senior liens., and relatively small
proportions were debentures.
Generally speaking, the trends in the percentages in Table 41
reflect important changes in the laws of the various states and in
the ability of obligors in different industry groups to meet the
statutory tests. For example, virtually all of the issues on the legal
lists were rated I—Iv by the agencies through 1928. Because of the
legal moratoria in Massachusetts and New York the quality of
legal bonds in those two states then deteriorated, but not in
Maine, where the tests were rigidly enforced. The tightening up
of the Massachusetts railroad law in 1941 is reflected in the im-
proved ratings assigned Massachusetts legals between 1940 and
1944, but during the same period relatively large proportions of
low-rated rail issues became legal in Maine and New York. Cross-
classifications of the data for 1936 and 1944 by composite rating
and major industry group show that the states were less selective
in the rail than in the utility and industrial fields.
The size tests imposed by the states are reflected in the higher
proportions of large issues on the legal lists and of issues of large
obligors as compared with the corresponding proportions for the
market as a whole. The data show that a smaller proportion of the
Maine list than of the other legal lists was issued by the large ob-
ligors. This was because Maine was less restrictive than other states
on size of utility obligor.
As might be inferred from the fact that the issues of most large
railroads are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, in 1920 the
proportion of legal bonds traded there was very high. With the
general admission to the legal lists of public utilities in the late
1920's, the proportions of legals traded on the New York Stock
Exchange declined, but remained higher than the correspondingVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 241
proportions for total outstandings. Both the Stock Exchange and
the legal lists favor large issues and large obligors, as is reflected
in the fact that within major industry groups (not shown sepa-
rately in the table) the proportions of legal bonds traded on the
New York Stock Exchange are uniformly above the corresponding
proportions for all outstanding issues.
The higher proportions of long-term issues for the legal lists
than for all issues outstanding in the market reflects the favoritism
shown the rails, and the longer than average maturities of such
issues. Since investment in bond issues of gas and electric com-
panies was restricted in Massachusetts to maturities of thirty years
or less (changed in 1937 to admit maturities up to forty years), the
long-term section of that list was comprised almost entirely of
rails. Before the 1937 amendment the only legal utilities in Massa-
chusetts having maturities of over thirty years were telephone
bonds and a few local issues. Other differences in the maturity
patterns among the state lists can largely be traced to the vary-
ing emphasis given the different industry groups.
Legal restrictions on the types of security that may be pur-
chased are also reflected in the higher proportions of senior liens
on the lists and lower proportions of debentures than for all issues
outstanding in the market. Table 41 exhibits a clear-cut legal
preference for senior liens in each of the years studied. The data
for 1944, however, indicate a drift toward debentures and away
from senior issues.
On the whole, it would appear that the legal lists unduly
favored the rails and prevented adequate diversification by in-
dustry. Considered individually, however, most of the issues on
the lists possessed the characteristics usually deemed desirable in
securities of investment quality. During the period studied the
legal lists were comprised essentially of large, well secured, market-
able issues of top grade, backed by the financial power and
strength of larger than average obligors.
Inclusiveness and Uniformity
of the Legal Lists
Part of the price paid for the desirable attributes of legal bonds is
the restricted volume of securities that meet the legal tests. Evi-
dence on this matter is presented in Tables 42 and 43, the first
showing the proportions of the total volume of outstanding issues
in the major industry groups that were legal in the different states,242 LEGAL LISTS
and the second, similar proportions for bond offerings. To permit
analysis of the uniformity, or consistency, of the statutes, the
tables also contain breakdowns into issues eligible for savings
bank investment in any one of the states studied, in any two of
them, and in all three of them.
One way of judging a legal list—or indeed any other selective
list of securities—is by its inclusiveness. Other things equal,
broader list allows the investor greater freedom of selection and
TABLE 42—Percent of Outstandings





















































































































































































































OF YEAR OneTwo of AUTotal Par
Massa-New Stale the ThreeAmount
MainechuseltsYork OnlyStatesStates(millions)
Industrials
1932 2.8% 2.8% $5,326.6
1936 0.8 0.8 3,752.2
1940 2.1 5.0%2.9 2.1% 3,455.4




1916 22.7 19.3 7.8 17.1 12,646.0
1920 24.0 19.5 5.9 18.8 13,668.1
1924 31.1 18.5 19.8 14.5 4.8 15.1%16,176.5
1928 32.919.227.911.8 11.6 15.021,251.3
1932 25.020.734.517.4 14.9 11.024,233.7
1936 18.9 27.6 35.6 12.3 15.7 12.8 22,777.5
1940 23.828.329.5 12.0 15.0 13.222,683.1
1944 43.7 27.5 38.6 14.2 12.7 23.4 20,845.0
Small Issues
1912 8.1 8.1 4,375.1
1916 10.5 8.9 3.6 7.9 4,580.6
1920 10.6 9.4 2.8 8.6 4,417.0
1924 15.6 9.8 9.4 10.6 4.0 5.4 4,858.8
1928 19.4 13.3 10.1 11.2 8.3 5.0 5,225.2
1932 17.4 13.2 16.5 11.5 12.1 3.8 4,780.3
1936 11.2 14.6 17.5 11.1 10.4 3.8 3,740.3
1940 8.3 9.6 7.8 8.0 5.7 2.1 2,677.4
1944 12.2 5.9 17.3 12.3 4.5 4.7 1,952.8
Based on Tables 7 and 9 of Statistical Measures: par-amount data for all
large (straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted
quadrennially to universe totals. Omission of Subdivision 7-a legals from the
New York list in 1932—44 reduces the coverage of the rail group and other
affected categories as follows:
All Large Small
OF YEAR Issues Railroads Issues Issues
1932 14.3% 15.1% 16.2% 4.5%
1936 13.0 8.0 14.3 4.7
1940 17.8 9.4 19.3 5.0
1944 23.2 12.7 24.5 9.8244 LEGAL LISTS
diversification, and reduces the likelihood that price premiums
may result from the channeling of funds into a narrowly re-
stricted list. Other important attributes of a sound list to be ex-
amined later in the chapter are its stability, and—of paramount
importance-_the actual yield and loss experience of the issues on
the list.
The legal lists do not fare well when judged on the basis of
their inclusiveness. On the average over the period studied, only
about one-quarter of the total volume of outstandings was eligible
for savings bank investment in Maine, and the same was true of
the lists of Massachusetts and New York. In no quadrennial year
except 1936 and 1944 did any one of the lists include an amount
as great as that rated in the first two grades by the agencies, and in
no year did any of them include as much as was rated in the first
four grades (cf. Table 27). Measured by percentages of the par-
amount totals of all outstanding issues included, the Massachu-
setts list was the most restrictive, and the Maine list the least. As
has been indicated, however, the Maine list was quite restrictive
during the depressed thirties, primarily because of the stringent
application of the earnings test for rails.
As the preceding review of the state laws has suggested, the legal
lists were least restrictive for rails, and most restrictive for indus-
trials. Thus on the average each state list included roughly one-
third of the total of rail outstandings, and the New York list, over
one-half in 1932 and 1936. This compares with roughly 20 percent
for utilities (in years when they were generally eligible) and only
5 percent for industrials. In the public utility field, the Massa-
chusetts list was the most restrictive, while the Maine list was the
most liberal. In the twenties, the same was true of the rails, but
in the thirties the moratoria discussed above changed the rank-
ing, so that New York ended up as the least restrictive state with
respect to rail issues and Massachusetts the most restrictive. Com-
parison with Table 27 indicates that after 1928 one-third or more
of the total volume of public utility outstandings was rated by
the agencies in the first two grades, well above the proportions
eligible in the various states before 1944. Table 42 shows that the
lists were also highly selective in the case of the small issues, 19
percent being the largest fraction of their total par amount that
was eligible in any state in any year (Maine 1928). The agencies
also discriminated against the small issues (Table 27), but not to
to the same extent as the legal lists.VOLUME AND CHARACTERiSTICS 245
An indication, that the laws were needlessly restrictive is pro-
vided by the small proportion of issues jointly eligible in all three
of the states studied. For example, in 1928, when 30 percent, 18
percent, and 24 percent of the par-amount total of outstanding
issues was eligible in Maine, Massachusetts, and New York, re-
spectively, only 13 percent was eligible in all three states. To put
the matter differently, 12 percent, 11 percent, and 13 percent of
the total volume of outstandings in 1928 was eligible in one, two,
and three states, respectively, so that 36 percent of the total was
eligible in one or more states. Thus of the 36 percent eligible in
at least one of the states in that year, Maine, the most liberal Se-
lector, rejected issues amounting to 6 percent (or one-sixth); and
Massachusetts, the most restrictive, rejected issues amounting to
18 percent (or one-half). Measured by the volume of legal issues
excluded, Massachusetts was the most restrictive state from 1924
on, except in 1936 and 1940, when the Maine list missed an ex-
ceptionally large proportion of issues eligible in other states.
The evidence does suggest a possible drift toward greater uni-
forrnity in the state laws. In 1944, for example, 22 percent of the
total volume of outstandings was jointly eligible in all three of
the states studied, almost twice the proportion for any of the
earlier years. The laws, however, were still far from uniform. In
the same year, 48 percent of aggregate outstandings was eligible
for savings bank investment in one or more of the states studied,
yet only 26 percent of the total was eligible in Massachusetts, 37
percent in New York, and 41 percent in Maine. By way of con-
trast, 60 percent of the aggregate volume of outstandings in the
same year was rated in the top four grades by the investment
agencies (Table 27).
The quadrennial breakdowns of bond offerings in Table 43
tell essentially the same story as the outstandings, and show in ad-
dition that the proportion of bonds legal at offering was usually
well below the corresponding proportion of outstandings. (Com-
pare particularly the percentages of bonds jointly eligible at offer-
ing in all three states, 1920—31, with the related figures for out-
standings in Table 42). The data indicate that new issues were
usually picked up slowly, and that some seasoning on the market
was frequently required before they were placed on the lists. The
periods 1932—35 and 1936—43 were exceptional in that substantial
proportions of the new offerings met the tests in those years. The
market was disorganized in the first of these periods, and only246 LEGAL LISTS
TABLE 43—Percent of
Massachusetts, and
Offerings Legal at Offering in























Based on Table 61of Statistical Me&sures: par-amount data for all large
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issues of the very highest grade could be floated. (A few low-
grade rail offerings that appeared as exchanges or contract modi-
fications were retained on the legal lists of Massachusetts and
New York under the moratoria.) In the second period most of the
new offerings were public utility refundings, also of high grade.
Since only the better issues were floated in these periods, excep-
tionally large proportions became eligible at offering. Even so,
only about one-third to one-half of the utilities were placed on the
legal lists at offering.
Stability of the Legal Lists
In addition to the inclusiveness of a given list of securities, a sec-
ond desirable feature is its stability, as measured by the volume of
securities retained on the list over different periods. Perfect sta-
bility cannot be expected of any list selected by human, and falli-
ble, means. As mistakes of judgment occur and are corrected, se-
curities will be dropped from the list. Nevertheless, large and
erratic fluctuations in the volume of eligible investments are un-
desirable if they are due simply to the temporary inability of
obligors to meet one or more of the standards imposed in draw-
ing up the list. A highly unstable list in this sense frequently
forces the investor to buy when prices are high and sell when
prices are low.42
Some evidence bearing on the stability of the legal lists is given
in Table 44, which contains percentages of the par-amount totals
of bonds legal at offering in the states studied that were still legal
at extinguishment (or January 1, 1944, if still outstanding on that
date). Although the legal lists were quite restrictive, over the long
pull they appear to have been reasonably stable, judged solely
on the basis of these data. Thus 82 percent of the par amount of
bonds legal at offering in Maine and 83 percent of the correspond-
ing total of bonds legal in New York were still legal at extinguish-
ment, records that compare favorably with the 77 percent of
bonds rated i—iv at offering by the agencies and still so rated at
extinguishment (cf. Table 30). Surprisingly enough, the Massa-
chusetts list, which was the most restrictive as to volume, was also
42Liquidationat temporarily depressed prices may be avoided if investors
are permitted to hold previously eligible securities for a reasonable time, even
though further purchases may not be permitted until the securities again
comply with the legal tests. See the Massachusetts law of 1908 and the New
York emergency legislation of 1938 (summarized earlier in the chapter) for
provisions of the indicated type.248 LEGAL LISTS
the least stable, only 78 percent of the amount eligible at offering
still being eligible at extinguishment.
As in the case of bonds rated high grade by the agencies, legal
rails made the poorest showing as measured by the percent still
eligible at extinguishment, while legal public utilities and indus-
trials both had reasonably good records (the latter, of course,
TABLE 44—Offerings 1900—1943 Legal in Maine, Massachu-
setts, and New York at Offering, Distributed by Legal
Status at Extinguishment
LEGAL ATOFFERINGIN
LEGAL AT EX- — '














Maine 82.2% 78.7%74.1% 61.0% 72.9% 89.5%9.1%
Massachusetts 56.0 77.7 59.8 26.0 40.793.3 4.8
NewYork 66.3 78.7 83.144.466.994.7 7.6
Onestateonly 20.3 9.6 12.5 39.018.5 1.5 5.8
Twostates 20.1 16.6 25.3 20.138.710.8 3.8
Threestates 48.0 64.1 51.3 17.428.284.8 2.7
Notlegal 11.6 9.7 10.9 23.5 14.6 2.9 87.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0100.0100.0 100.0
Railroads
Maine 69.164.6 55.1 41.8 55.588.4 13.9
Massachusetts 39.6 51.639.2 23.1 32.9 76.1 9.3
NewYork 63.6 67.0 66.2 .54.657.388.4 20.0
Onestateonly 13.8 13.6 22.0 21.826.0 0.0 10.9
Twostates 22.4 21.8 21.1 20.825,212.3 8.2
Threestates 37.9 42.0 32.1 18.7 21.1 76.1 5.3
Notlegal 25.9 22.6 24.8 38.7 24.7 11.6 75.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0100.0 100.0
Public Utilities
Maine 86.086.2 86.3 71.4 89.189.7 12.6
Massachusetts 62.6 91.7 73.6 30.549.597.4 6.0
NewYork 68.6 85.0 93.637.8 75.3 96.2 5.8
Onestateonly 20.8 7.5 6.1 48.611.7 1.8 6.1
Twostates 19.3 13.7 26.0 18.1 47.110.4 4.2
Three states 52.6 76.0 65.8 18.3 36.086.9 3.3
Notlegal 7.3 2.8 2.1 15.0 5.2 0.9 86.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0100.0100.0 100.0VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 249
TABLE 44
(concluded)
LEGAL AT OFFERING IN
LEGAL AT EX- -.













NewYork 22.7 100.043.8100.0 0.8
One state only 63.7 13.754.6 0.0 1.7
Twostates 22.7 86.3 35.5 100.0 0.2
Three states
Not legal 13.6 0.09.9 0.0 98.1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0
Based on Table 67 of Statistical Measures: par-amount data for all large
(straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted annually
to universe totals. Legal status at extinguishment refers to the status of an
issue within one year prior to date of final extinguishment or at the beginning
of 1944, if still outstanding at that time.
reflecting the fact that they became eligible towards the close of
the period studied). It may be recalled that although an unusually
large amount of rail bonds was dropped from the legal list of
Maine in the thirties, a substantial amount was restored in the
forties. The latter action, coupled with the fact that the Maine
statute favored the more stable utility bonds, accounts for the
large proportion of the volume of bonds legal in Maine at offer-
ing that was still legal at extinguishment.
In the chapter on agency ratings it was found that the higher
grades tended to be more stable than the lower. The same is true
if the measure of quality is the number of states in which the
issue was legal at offering. Thus 85 percent of the total volume
of bonds legal in all three states at offering was still legal at ex-
tinguishment, as compared with only 39 percent of the total legal
in one state or in two states. Contrariwise, only 3 percent of the
total volume of bonds legal in all three states at offering was not
legal in any of the states at extinguishment, as compared with
corresponding percentages of 15 and 24, respectively, for bonds
legal at offering in two states and in one state.250 LEGAL LISTS
One of the interesting features of Table 44 is the large propor-
tion, by volume, of bonds legal in Massachusetts at offering that
remained legal in all three states at extinguishment (64 percent:
the corresponding percentages for New York and Maine are, re-
spectively, 51 and 48). In this sense, Massachusetts legals con-
stituted a rock-bottom conservative list. By the same token, the
New York list was least conservative in the rail field, and the
Maine list the least conservative in the public utility field.
Additional evidence on the stability of the legal lists is pre-
sented in Table 45, which shows the percentages of the par-
amount totals of bonds legal in the various states at the beginning
of the quadrennial periods that were still legal at the end of
those periods. The table is analogous to Table 31 based on agency
rating grade: in both cases issues extinguished during a period
were removed, for purposes of comparability. Such percentages
are perhaps more relevant to some savings banks than percentages
based on offerings, since the banks frequently purchase bonds in
the secondary market after offering and may be required to liqui-
date their holdings promptly when issues are dropped from the
lists.
Although the Massachusetts list was the least stable of the
three as measured by the percent of offerings still legal at extin-
guishment, it was the most stable over several of the four-year
periods. The reason for the larger proportion of bonds dropped
from the Massachusetts list than from the New York list in 1928—
31 is that the emergency moratorium on rail earnings took effect
in New York in time to retain issues on the official list drawn up
at the close of the period, but not in Massachusetts, where the
first moratorium did not occur until 1933. The reason for the
large proportion of bonds dropped from the Massachusetts list
in 1940—43 was the tightening up of the railroad law in 1941.
If such action had not been taken, the proportion of the aggre-
gate volume of Massachusetts legals at the beginning of the period
that was still legal at the end would have been about the same
as in the other two states.
The statistics also indicate that legal utilities were on the whole
more stable than legal rails during the thirties, although there
is not much to choose from in earlier periods. Exceptionally large
amounts of rail bonds were dropped from the legal lists of Maine
and New York during the thirties, in Maine because of the rigid
application of the earnings test throughout that period, and inVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 251
TABLE 45—Outstandings Legal in Maine, Massachusetts, and
New York at Beginning of Four-year Periods Distributed
by Legal Status at End; 1912—43




PERIOD AT END OF PERIOD
Legal in Not Legal
Maine in Maine
AT END OF PERIOD
Legal in Not Legal
Mass.in Mass.
AT END OF PERIOD
Legal inNot Legal
New York in New York
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research:
par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of
small issues adjusted quadrennially to universe totals, with issues extinguished
during each period excluded.














































































































































New York because of the termination of the moratorium on rail
earnings in 1938. Many of the rail bonds were later restored to
the lists as rail earnings improved during the early war years.
For example, 34 percent of the total volume of rail bonds in-
eligible for savings bank investment in Maine in 1940 was added
to the list by 1944; the corresponding amount for New York was
26 percent (the figures are not shown in the table). Legal utilities
held up fairly well during the thirties, the principal exception
being Maine, 1932—35. The Maine list included an exceptionally
large proportion of utilities in 1932 and some of these issues were
dropped as earnings deteriorated (most of the deletions were
rated in the fourth grade by the investment agencies, i.e. good
grade but not highest quality). The deletions were unfortunate,
as many of these issues (32 percent by volume) were later retired
by call or other contractual method without being restored to
the Maine list.
The Legal Lists a.nd Business Cycles
To determine the sensitivity of the legal lists to the short-run ups
and downs of the business cycle, special annual series were con.
structed covering par amounts of offerings, extinguishments, net
upgrading, etc. The series are analogous to those examined in
the preceding chapter (see the section "Agency Ratings and Busi-
ness Cycles"). Indexes of cyclical conformity for the various series,
calculated on the assumption that the timing of their turning
points was roughly coincident with the general business cycle, are
shown in Table 46; the series on net changes and net upgrading
are plotted against the National Bureau's reference cycles in
Charts 13 and
It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that the investment agencies
typically upgraded bonds during business expansions and down-
graded them during business contractions. A similar relationship
43 The two series for net upgrading of legal bonds, which measure the ex-
cess of gross additions of outstanding securities to the lists over gross deletions,
correspond to Variants i and ix of Chapter 3. Since the published legal lists
are presumably fairly complete (cf. p. 216), they may be conceived of as divid-
ing all outstanding issues into "legals" (or high grades) and "nonlegals" (or
low grades); thus there is no troublesome third category of unrated issues
such as was encountered in Chapter 3. Since Variants i and it are very similar
under these conditions, only one variant (Variant ii)is plotted in Chart 14.
Industrial bonds generally, and public utilities in New York, are not shown
separately in the table and charts since none was legal for as much as two full
cycles; but they are included in the all-industry series.VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 253
would be expected of legal bonds as well, in the absence of statu-
tory changes that might obscure the effects of the business cycle.
The conformity indexes and the charts show that for two of the
states studied the various statutory amendments did in fact ob-
scure the effects of the business cycle. Except for the Maine series
(which cover only three cycles but which agree closely with the
behavior of issues rated i—iv by the agencies) the conformity in-
dexes for the net changes and net upgrading are quite low and
erratic in sign. The sensitivity of the Maine series to the business
cycle appears to have been caused by the fact that few changes
of any consequence occurred in the Maine law during the period
studied, so that the volume of Maine legals could respond freely
to fluctuations in earnings coverage and other relevant economic
factors. By way of contrast, major legal changes occurred in Massa-
chusetts and New York (including in particular the moratoria
on rail earnings) and these obscured the response of the lists to
the business cycle.
The legal amendments would be expected to have their most
pronounced effect on outstandings (and hence on the series for net
changes and net upgrading), and less effect on bonds legal at offer-
ing or at final extinguishment. On the whole, the conformity in-
dexes seem to substantiate this point. Most of the conformity
indexes for offerings agree with the I—Iv's in being low and nega-
tive. The indexes are also low, but mixed in sign, for bonds legal
at date of final extinguishment; the same was true for bonds rated
'—Iv.
As has been noted earlier, the conformity indexes of Table 46
do not take account of possible leads or lags of the series at ref-
erence-cycle turning points; however, a special analysis of the all-
industry series for each state failed to reveal marked departures
from the standard reference pattern except for Massachusetts of-
ferings and final extinguishments and Maine offerings and net
upgrading. For Massachusetts, the series for bonds legal at offering
typically rose from the reference peak to the middle of the follow-
ing expansion (the same as total bond offerings; see Volume of
Financing); but the conformity indexes when recomputed on
that basis are not materially different from those given in Table
46 (—50 for expansions, —25 for contractions, and —33 for the
full cycle). Bonds legal in Massachusetts at date of final extinguish-
ment are also timed the same as total final extinguishments, typi-
cally rising only during the first half of reference expansions, and254 LEGAL LISTS
CHART 13—Net Changes in Outstandings legal in Maine, Massa-

















Maine Massachusetts New York
Universe estimates for straight bonds, yearly totals in par amount, from "Statistical
Measures," Table 7.
Shaded areas, representing contractionsin general business activity, and white
areas, representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's
"Measuring Business Cycles" (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 78.
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CHART 14—Net Upgrading of Outstanding Issues as Reflected in
















———— Maine Massachusetts New York
Universe estimates for straight bonds, from "Statistical Measures," Tables 7, 6T,
and 64.
Net upgrading is that part of the annual net change in the par-amount total of
bonds legal in a given state tha.t is attributable (a) to adding or dropping outstand-
ing issues that newly met or ceased to meet the legal standards for savings bank
investment, or (b) to revision of the laws. Positive values indicate a greater amount
added; negative values, a greater amount dropped. The estimates correspond to
Variant iiin Charts 9 and 19, and are exact except for lack of information on
partial extinguishments.
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Shaded areas, representing contractionsingeneral business activity, and white
areas, representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































falling during the second half and throughout reference con-
tractions. The conformity indexes for Massachusetts final ex-
tinguishments computed on the revised basis are +57, +25, and
+57•
More interesting results were obtained for Maine offerings and
net upgrading. Over each of the three cycles studied, new offer-
ings of Maine legals rose from mid-expansion of the reference
cycle to mid-contraction, whereas the net upgrading of old issues
followed the reverse pattern, rising from mid-contraction to mid-
expansion. The conformity indexes for the two series, when re-
computed on the basis of their respective timing patterns, all
changed to +100. Despite the perfect conformity on the revised
bases, not too much confidence can be placed in the results be-
cause of the small number of cycles covered and the difficulty of
determining timing patterns from annual data. Strictly speaking,
the observed timing of both series is neutral with respect to the
business cycle, so that it is impossible to determine on purely
statistical grounds whether they led or lagged at reference turns.
Since the legal tests are based so largely on past earnings, we
should expect offerings and net upgrading of Maine legals to
conformpositively and to lag behind reference turns, which seems
to happen for offerings but not for net upgrading. Thus it would
appear that the volume of new offerings, meeting the legal tests
of Maine lagged behind the reference turns and was larger when
business was buoyant than when it was depressed. The net up-
grading of Maine legals cannot be explained satisfactorily on
this basis, since the series leads at reference turns if it conforms
positively or lags if it conforms negatively. Unfortunately, all that
we can be reasonably sure of is that Maine legals were upgraded
during the early stages of business expansions; their timing dur-
ing business contractions cannot be determined accurately from
the annual data.
On the whole, it appears that the legal lists, unlike the group
rated high grade by the agencies, were relatively insensitive to
business cycles. The Maine list appears to have been an excep-
tion, probably because there were no major changes in the law
during the period studied, and the legal tests were applied re-
lentlessly throughout. The net upgrading of Maine legals there-
fore expanded during early business expansions as old securities
previously ineligible for savings bank investment were added to
the legal list; similarly, during late business expansions and earlyiNVESTOR EXPERIENCE 261
contractions the volume of offerings meeting the Maine legal tests
increased. Statutory changes in the other states obscured the con-
formity to the business cycle.
INVESTOR EXPERIENCE WITH LEGAL BONDS
The purpose of the original legislation regulating savings bank
investment was to provide the smaller banks with a select list of
high-grade securities—a list for which the risks of default and of
capital loss on individual issues might safely be neglected. To
the extent that the statutes achieved their purpose, the legal lists
should exhibit low default rates and low default losses on legal
bonds.
Unlike the small investor,the large investorislesscon-
cerned with the protective features of the legal lists than with
the adequacy of average rates of return. From his point of view
the interesting question is whether the lower promised yields that
result from confining purchases to a list of individually "safe"
securities are more than made up for by the lower default losses
incurred. To throw light on these matters, we shall next examine
the default record of legal bonds, and then consider the average
returns obtained on them over different periods of investment.
Default Rates
Percentages of the par-amount totals of bonds legal at offering
that subsequently went into default are presented in Table 47.
The table covers only regular offerings included in the offerings
experience sample (cf. Table 3 and accompanying text).
The table reveals that the record of the legal lists was excellent
for the public utility group. As compared with the 6.3 percent
of the aggregate volume of large public utility offerings (other than
street railways) that subsequently went into default, those legal
at offering were entirely free of default. The record of the small
legal utilities (again exclusive of street railways) was almost as
good, only 3.5 percent of their amount subsequently going into
default in the state with the poorest record (New York), as com-
pared with 13.2 percent of all offerings in this industry-size group.
The default record of the legal rails (large issues and small) is
much less impressive than that of the utilities. (The performance
of the large street railways was even worse, but they were appar-
ently admitted to the legal lists for the purpose of aiding local






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































portant by volume that the rate for all large utilities is virtually
unaffected by their poor performance.) In Maine, the state with
the most liberal railroad law, 31 percent of the par amount of
large legal rail issues subsequently went into default, as compared
with 28 percent of all large rail issues. Both in Massachusetts and
New York, states with more restrictive statutes than Maine, 22
percent of rail bonds eligible at offering subsequently went into
default, a record only slightly better than that of the market as a
whole.
The excellent default record of legal public utility bonds and
the poor records of the railroads and street railways combined
to produce a default rate for all bonds legal at offering about half
that of total offerings (7 percent for Maine, 8 percent for Massa-
chusetts, and 9 percent for New York legals; 17 percent for all
large issues). Clearly the legal statutes, while highly restrictive as
to volume, failed to achieve their primary purpose of including
only riskiess investments at offering, except in the public utility
field. It remains to examine whether the record of the legal lists
was markedly different in this respect from that of the invest-
ment agencies, which also attempt to rank securities in order of
their relative freedom from default. A clue is provided by com-
paring the default rates for legal bonds with similar rates for is-
sues selected on the basis of the composite agency rating (cf.
Table 33). For large issues the legal default rates fell between
those of issues rated iiandiii;butthe legal lists usually included
a much smaller projortion of offerings (cf. Tables 28 and 43).
It would appear, therefore, that the legal lists at offering were
less accurate indicators of default risk than the ratings of the
investment agencies. A further comparison of default rates for
legal and other high-grade bonds, based on equally inclusive
groups of outstanding issues, will be made in Chapter 6.
The number of states in which an issue was legal at offering
appears to stand up fairly well as a measure of bond quality un-
der empirical testing. For example, less than 2 percent of the par
amount of large issues eligible for savings bank investment at
offering in all of the three state analyzed subsequently went into
default, as compared with over 19 percent for issues not legal in
any one of the three states. The record of small issues legal in
all three states at offering was also excellent. It should be remem-
bered, however, that the volume of securities meeting this severe
test was quitesmall.264 LEGAL LISTS
The default rates for all small issues behave as would be ex-
pected, being higher as the number of states in which the issue
was legal decreases. For the large rails and the small public util-
ities, the default rates for issues legal in two states were higher
than for issues legal in only one state; but these discrepancies are
small and, in the case of the small utilities, are perhaps attribut-
able to sampling errors. It is noteworthy that the default rates of
offerings legal in one state and in two states were uniformly higher
than those of offerings legal in all three states.
Additional materials on the default record of legal bonds are pre-
sented in Table 48, which contains default rates based on par.
amount totals of issues classified by legal status at the beginning of
the indicated quadrennial periods. As in all of our tables of this
type, the rates were derived from sample data adjusted to universe
totals, and exclude issues in default at beginning of periods.
Contrasting with the percentages of issues legal at offering that
subsequently went into default, the quadrennial default rates
for legal bonds show that over short periods the legal lists were
highly sensitive to impending defaults. The fact that the quad-
rennial default rates for legals are very low and that the differ-
ences between the rates for legal and nonlegal outstandings are
usually much greater than the corresponding life-span rates based
on offerings indicates that issues legal at offering were frequently
dropped from the legal lists before they went into default. The
same phenomenon was observed for issues rated high grade by
the agencies (cf. Table 35).
For each of the states studied the quadrennial default rates for
outstanding issues of the combined industries legal at the begin-
fling of the periods were lower than those for total outstandings,
except in New York in 1924—27 (5.0 percent as against 4.4 per-
cent). Moreover, the highest of the default rates for the major
industry components of the legal lists were below those for bonds
rated i—ivbythe agencies in 13 of the 19 periods for which com-
parisons are possible with our data and were equal in two pe-
riods (cf. Table 35). The exceptions were Maine rails in 1932—35,
Massachusetts rails in 1936—39, and New York rails and Maine
utilities in 1924—27. The relatively high default rate for New York
rails, 1924-27, is attributable to defaults on two large issues of
the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway, issues not legal
in the other two states. The Maine utility default rate for 1924—27,INVESTOR EXPERIENCE 265
although higher than for grades i—iv over the same period, is still
only 1.4 percent, and was caused by the difficulties of small, prob-
ably local, utilities. The heavy default incidence for Maine rails,
1932—35, was caused by defaults of the Missouri Pacific and the
New York, New Haven, and Hartford. The defaulting issues were
never legal in New York and were not legal in Massachusetts after
1914. The high default rate on Massachusetts legal rails for 1936—
39 appears to be due largely to the poor record of the low-grade
issues kept on the list under the moratoria of the mid-thirties. The
high default rate of the New York rail list in those years is attribu-
table to the same cause (all of the New York defaults from 1932
on were Subdivision 7-a legals). In Maine, where moratoria were
not applied, the list was entirely free of defaults from 1936 on-
ward.
It appears, therefore, that the legal status of an issue usually
served as a good index to its default risk over the quadrennial
periods. In all cases the quadrennial default rates for legals were
below those for nonlegals, except New York rails, 1924—27. More-
over the superiority of the legals over the nonlegals would have
been even greater if the statutes had not been biased in favor
of the rails.
Issues legal in all three of the states studied had a perfect de-
fault record over each of the four-year periods, and the same was
true of public utilities legal in two of the three states. The de-
fault record of rails legal in two states was marred principally by
the poor performance in the period 1936—39. It is worth noting
that none of the defaulted issues of that period was legal in Maine,
the only state in which the statutory tests were rigorously applied.
We conclude that the number of states in which an issue is legal
provides a good index to the probable incidence of default over
short periods, particularly when the statutory tests are applied
consistently throughout the periods. The legal lists taken individ-
ually, although not free from defaults, also performed quite well
over short periods. The data previously examined on bond of-
ferings, and other materials presented in Statistical Measures on
default rates over longer chronological periods, show, however,
that the efficacy of legality as an indicator of default risk deterio-
rates as the period lengthens. That is to say, the longer the period







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Because of the short-run sensitivity of the legal lists to impend-
ing defaults, data covering legal status five years and one year
before default (similar to those presented in the preceding chap-
ter on agency ratings; cf. Table 37) are too sketchy to permit re-
liable statistical inferences. To round out the record, however,
such materials as are available are presented in Table 49. Data
corresponding to Table 38 are also quite sketchy, but, for what
they may be worth, are presented in Table 50.
The most important conclusion to be' drawn from these tables
is the small number of defaulted issues included, and the con-
sequent unreliability of the averages. The data of Table 49 sug-
gest that there was little to choose from as between legal and non-
legal bonds in their behavior as measured by the discounted
values of receipts and by realized yields calculated from default
to extinguishment, and the same was true of issues legal in one,
two or three states. However, because of the small number of
issues covered by the table, little confidence can be placed in this
conclusion, particularly for the smaller issues.
Table 50 does indicate clearly that the promised yields at of-
fering on the legal bonds that subsequently went into default
were systematically below those of other issues of the same type.
Except for Massachusetts legals, the average yields realized on
large legal bonds held from offering to default were uniformly
negative and were somewhat lower than for all large issues.
The average loss rates on legal bonds were the'refore quite high,
showing that the legality of an issue is no protection against sub-
stantial capital loss, if issues are sold at default. In fact, the losses
taken on large legal issues sold at default averaged out at 15 per-
cent per annum for Maine (based on the price paid at offering),
9 percent for New York, and 5 percent for On
the other hand, the realized yields calculated from offering turned
predominantly positive for defaulted issues held to final extin-
guishment.
The conclusions are that a large part of the losses suffered on
44Theexplanation for the poor performance of the few large Maine legals
that defaulted was that the list was not published until 1924, so that many
issues legal at offering in Maine were outstanding for only a few years before
the heavy defaults of the Great Depression. This is illustrated by the corn.
paratively short average period from offering to default for defaulted issues






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 50—Yields and Loss Rates up to Default and over Life
Span of Issues Defaulting 1900—1943 Classified by Legal
Status in Maine, Massachusetts, and New York at
Offering

















Maine 16 5.1 —9.7 14.8 0.3 4.8
Massachusetts 17 5.1 0.1 5.0 2.3 2.8
NewYork 22 5.2 —3.8 9.0 2.0 3.2
Onestateonly16 4.7 —5.1 9.8 1.0 3.7
Two states 15 5.4 —3.6 9.0 2.2 3.2
Three states 3 4.9 —5.4 10.3 0.3 4.6
Small Issues
Alismallissues119 7.8 —4.0 11.8 2.4 5.4
Legal in
Maine 1 5.9 4.7 1.2 4.3 1.6
Massachusetts 3 4.8 4.4 0.4 4.0 0.8
NewYork 1 4.9 4.9 0.0 4.9 0.0
Onestateonly 3 5.2 4.4 0.8 3.9 1.3
Two states 1 4.9 4.9 0.0 4.9 0.0
Three states 0
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research,
covering issues in the default experience sample. Yields and ioss rates are
unweighted averages. For issues still outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquida-
tion is assumed at prices prevailing in the first quarter of the year.
defaulted issues was avoidable, and that substantial capital gains
were obtained on corporate bonds (both legals and nonlegals)
when purchased at default and held to extinguishment. The data
also suggest that the realized yields on defaults held from offering
to final extinguishment were on the average lower with legals
than with nonlegals, but the number of defaulting legals is too
small to permit a firm conclusion.
Average Yields and Loss Rates on Legal Bonds
The default incidence and default losses on legal bonds are of
primary concern to the small investor who is unable to balanceiNVESTOR EXPERIENCE 271
losses on some issues against offsetting capital gains on others.
The large investor—particularly the large institutional investor
—is interested, besides, in the possible use of legal lists as guides
to the prospective average rate of return. Statistics bearing on this
matter are presented in Table 51, which contains weighted aver-
age life-span yields and loss rates for all offerings in the offerings
experience sample, and for such of these as were legal at offering
in the states covered by this investigation. Except in cells specifi-
cally designated, each of the averages presented in the table covers
at least five offerings. (For further details on coverage, and life-
span yields over various periods, see Statistical Measures, Table
188 and the notes under the section on measures of experience
from offering to extinguishment.)
The table shows that the average promised yields on large issues
legal at offering were consistently below those of the large non-
legals, the average being 1.6 percent for all offerings
during the full period 1900—1 943, and 1.3 to 1.5 percent for regular
offerings since 1920. In addition, the average yields promised on
issues legal at offering in all three states were Consistently below
those of issues legal in two states and in one state. The implica-
tion is that the typical investor paid a premium at offering for
the restricted group of securities on the legal lists. This finding
confirms what was found to be true of bonds rated by the agencies:
namely, the higher the grade, the lower on the average was the
yield promised at offering. Since legal bonds are generally as-
signed top grades by the agencies, it remains an open question
whether legal status alone (i.e. the legality or nonlegality of issues
within a given rating classification) has a significant effect on
promised yield. That question will be examined in Chapter 6.
The average yields realized over the life spans of issues legal at
offering were also consistently below the yields on nonlegals, but
not so much below as was true of the corresponding promised
yields. For example, realized yields on large regular legal offerings
since 1920 averaged 0.6 to 0.8 percent below the nonlegals, as com-
pared with corresponding differentials in promised yields of 1.3
to 1.5 percent. It follows that while the realized returns on bonds
not legal at offering were typically above those on legal bonds, the
loss rates on the legals were lower. Negative average loss rates (i.e.
capital gains) occur in most of the cells of the table covering legal
bonds, and p.ositive loss rates (capital losses) in most of the cells






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 52—Yields and Loss Rates over Four-year and Longer
Periods of Investment on Bonds Legal in Maine, Massa-
chusetts, and New York at Beginning of Periods, 1912—43
All
LEGALIN
Massa- OneTwo ofAllNot Legal
Large chu-NewState the Threein Any of
PERIOD Issues MainesettsYorkOnlyStatesStatesthe States
Promised Yield
1912—15 4.7% 4.2% 4.2% 4.8%
1916—19 5.0 4.44.4% 4.54.4% 5.3
1920—23 6.9 6.16.06.46.0 7.2
1924—27 6.05.2%5.05.45.85.25.0%6.3
1928—31 5.04.54.44.44.74.64.3 5.3
1932—35 8.95.7 5.76.06.95.95.2 11.2
1936—39 4.93.84.04.24.84.13.6 5.4
1940—43 5.63.44.44.05.04.43.3 6.8
1920—27 6.7 6.06.06.16.0 6.9
1920—31 6.6 5.96.06.06.0 6.9





1912—15 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.6
1916—19 0.2 —0.5—0.8—0.1—0.7 0.5






1920—27 8.7 7.98.07.77.9 9.0
1920—31 6.1 5.25.15.45.2 6.4




offering and capital losses on nonlegals is surprising in view of the
large proportion of rails on the legal lists and their poor perform-
ance during the Great Depression.
Additional evidence bearing on the comparative performance
of legal and nonlegal bonds is presented in Table 52. The table





AllNot Legal Massa- OneTwo of
Large chu- NewState theThree in Any of
PERIOD IssuesMainesellsYorkOnlyStatesSlatesthe Stales
Loss Rate
1912—15 2.0% 1.2% 1.2% 2.2%
1916—19 4.8 4.95.2% 4.6 5.1% 4.8
1920—23—1.9 —1.9—1.9—2.0—1.8 —1.9
1924—27—2.5—2.5%-—2.5—2.5—2.1—2.2—2.7% —2.6
1928—31 5.94.4 4.03.9 5.0 3.5 4.2 6.9
1932—35—2.8—3.3—4.7—4.3—1.8—3.0—4.5—2.1
1936—39 3.6 1.5 4.44.6 5.1 6.4 1.0 2.8
1940—43—2.2—0.3—1.6—1.2—1.7—1.8—0.4—3.1
1920—27—2.0 —1.9—2.0—1.6—1.9 —2.1
1920—31 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.5
1920—39 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.6
1924—39 0.7 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.7
1928—39 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.1 1.3 2.0
1932—39 0.9—0.4—0.2 0.3 2.1 0.4—1.5 1.4
From Table 169 of Statistical Measures, covering large issues in the periodic
experience sample. Yields and loss rates are weighted averages with par
amounts of outstandings at the beginning of the relevant period as weights.
loss rates over chronological periods for large issues in the periodic
experience sample, classified by legal status at the beginning of
the periods.
Like the yields promised at offering, the average yields prom-
ised on issues outstanding at given dates and legal in the several
states were uniformly below those on nonlegals. In addition, the
average promised yields at the beginning of each of the periods
studied were perfectly ranked with respect to the number of
states in which the issues were legal, issues not legal in any of the
three states having the highest yields and those legal in all of the
three states the lowest. The differentials in promised yields be-
tween legal and nonlegal bonds widened considerably between
1928 and 1932, but narrowed substantially in later years.
The weighted average realized yields on legal bonds over the
assumed chronological periods of investment were also typically
below' those on nonlegals. While this was true oniy in a broad
average sense for the four-year periods (e.g. the mean of the eight276 LEGAL LISTS
averages of quadrennial realized yields for Massachusetts legals
was 4.3 percent as against 5.7 percent for nonlegals), it was true
uniformly for each of the longer periods. It may be recalled that
substantially the same relationships held generally among high-
grade and low-grade issues as rated by the agencies (Table 40),
although issues in the top grades (i—iv) had higher realized yields
over the "acid test" periods 1924—39, when the two groups were
very close, and 1928—39, when the high grades did definitely
better. Generally speaking, one would expect high-grade issues to
perform better than low grades in periods of financial distress, but
in the former of these two periods realized yields. were higher for
nonlegals than for legals, and in the latter the two groups be-
haved alike. Experience over periods of stress thus indicates a defi-
nite weakness of the legal lists as compared. with issues rated high
grade by the agencies. Examination of the detailed data presented
in Statistical Measures shows that the principal cause of the weak-
ness was not that the lists were insufficiently selective within the
major industry classifications, but that they did not permit wider
diversification among them. In this connection, it is worth noting
that the Maine list, which in 1924 included a larger volume of
outstandings than the others but which also permitted wider
diversification by industry, had the best yield record of the three
states over the test period 1924—39.
A further weakness of the legal lists is revealed by the behavior
of the loss rates over the chronological periods. Since loss, rates
calculated over chronological periods are largely governed by the
amount of price depreciation or appreciation from the price paid
at the beginning of the period, it might be expected that the ab-
solute value of the loss rate would be smaller (closer to zero.) for
high- than for low-grade The table shows, however, this
was not generally true of legal bonds, which were not markedly
more stable pricewise than the nonlegals. Again, the principal
reason for the weakness of the legal lists appears to be the empha-
sis given the rails, rather than errors in the selection of issues
within the major industry groups.
To summarize: Loss rates were generally lower on legal bonds
than on nonlegals when held from offering to extinguishment.
45Strictlyspeaking, the loss rate over a chronological period measures the
extent, converted to an annual basis, of price depreciation from the conven-
tional amortized book value to an investor who purchased at the market price
ruling at the beginning of the period (cf. Chapter 1).INVESTOR EXPERIENCE 277
On the other hand, because of the erratic behavior of the legal
rails, the prices of legals were not markedly more stable over
the chronological periods than those of other issues (i.e. absolute
values of loss rates for legal bonds were not markedly lower). In
addition, the promised and realized yields on nonlegal bonds
averaged well above those on legals. The conclusion is that in-
vestors who could afford to bear the greater exposure to default
risk inherent in nonlegal bonds would generally have obtained
higher returns on nonlegals than on legals.